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Studies of human adults, infants, and non-human animals demonstrate that non-symbolic
numerical cognition is supported by at least two distinct cognitive systems: a “paral-
lel individuation system” that encodes the numerical identity of individual items and an
“approximate number system” that encodes the approximate numerical magnitude, or
numerosity, of a set. The exact nature and role of these systems, however, have been
debated for over a 100-years. Some argue that the non-symbolic representation of small
numbers (<4) is carried out solely by the parallel individuation system and the non-symbolic
representation of large numbers (>4) is carried out solely by the approximate number sys-
tem. Others argue that all numbers are represented by the approximate number system.
This debate has been fueled largely by some studies showing dissociations between small
and large number processing and other studies showing similar processing of small and
large numbers. Recent work has addressed this debate by showing that the two systems
are present and distinct from early infancy, persist despite the acquisition of a symbolic
number system, activate distinct cortical networks, and engage differentially based atten-
tional constraints. Based on the recent discoveries, I provide a hypothesis that may explain
the puzzling ﬁndings and makes testable predictions as to when each system will be
engaged. In particular, when items are presented under conditions that allow selection
of individuals, they will be represented as distinct mental items through parallel individu-
ation and not as a numerical magnitude. In contrast, when items are presented outside
attentional limits (e.g., too many, too close together, under high attentional load), they will
be represented as a single mental numerical magnitude and not as distinct mental items.
These predictions provide a basis on which researchers can further investigate the role of
each system in the development of uniquely human numerical thought.
Keywords: number, cognition, representation, ERP, fMRI, attention, memory
INTRODUCTION
The brain has at least two systems for representing number non-
symbolically; however, these systems represent number in quali-
tatively different ways (see Feigenson et al., 2004 or Piazza, 2010
for reviews). The approximate number system encodes an impre-
cise estimate of the numerical magnitude, or numerosity1, of a
set of objects (see Gallistel, 1990; Butterworth, 1999; Nieder and
Dehaene, 2009; Dehaene, 2011 for reviews). The mental represen-
tations formed by this system can be used to compare and combine
numerical magnitudes. Importantly, this system uses one mental
symbol to summarize the set. In contrast, the parallel individu-
ation system forms a distinct mental symbol for each item (see
Carey, 2009 or Scholl, 2002 for reviews). This system privileges
spatiotemporal information to initiate a mental index, or object
ﬁle, for each item. Although inherently non-numerical in nature,
these representations afford numerical content by retaining infor-
mation about numerical identity – mentally stored items can be
1As a reviewer aptly pointed out, a distinction should bemade between“number”as
a mathematical entity and “numerosity” as a cardinal value of a set of items. When
referring to primitive numerical representations, speciﬁcally those of the approx-
imate number system, I am referencing the notion of a cardinal value of a set of
items, or numerosity, rather than “number” as a mathematical entity. In the paper I
also use the term “non-symbolic number representation” to refer to “numerosity.”
compared on a one-to-one basis with visible objects in the scene
to detect numerical matches or mismatches.
These systems are further characterized by their contrasting
limits (see Feigenson et al., 2004 for a review). The imprecision
of the approximate number system systematically increases as
numerosity increases. As a result, the ability to estimate numeros-
ity has no particular upper bound, but discrimination of any two
numerical quantities follows Weber’s Law, as it is a function of
the ratio between the two quantities to be compared. In contrast,
the ability to simultaneously represent and track objects through
parallel individuation is limited to only a few items (usually about
3–4)2. Representations through parallel individuation affordmore
ﬁne-grained numerical discriminations than those of the approx-
imate number system if numbers are within the range of this
system, but comparisons fail when the limits of this system are
surpassed. The signature limits of ratio and capacity have allowed
researchers to ﬁnd evidence of the two numerical systems across
2It should be noted that the current proposal could be applied to a ﬁxed slot/item-
limited model (e.g., Luck and Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2001; Zhang and Luck, 2008)
or resource/information-limited model of working memory (e.g., Alvarez and
Cavanagh, 2004; Wilken and Ma, 2004). This debate is intentionally avoided here
because it seems to be unresolved in the literature more generally.
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age-groups and species, suggesting these systems are innate, arise
very early in human infancy, and are shared with a wide variety of
non-human animals.
One difﬁculty in understanding the nature and function of
these systems has been in specifying the conditions under which
each system is engaged. This difﬁculty has been historically com-
pounded in experiments that contrast the processing of small
(<∼4) and large numbers (>4; e.g., Jevons, 1871; Kaufman et al.,
1949; Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994). Jevons (1871) was the ﬁrst to
demonstrate empirically a dissociation between small and large
number processing by asking subjects to count the number of
beans tossed into a shallow pan. He showed that enumeration
of 1–4 items was perfectly accurate, while errors increased as
the number of items to be enumerated increased beyond 4. The
phenomenon of precise, accurate, and seemingly instantaneous
enumeration of a small number of items, in contrast to the slower,
more inaccurate process for larger number of items, was later
termed “subitizing” to distinguish it from counting (Kaufman
et al., 1949).
The most striking dissociations seen between small and large
numbers, however, come from human infants without symbolic
counting abilities (e.g., Xu, 2003; Lipton and Spelke, 2004; Feigen-
son and Carey, 2005; Wood and Spelke, 2005). For example, after
watching an experimenter sequentially place 1 food item in one
bucket and 2 food items in a different bucket, human infants reli-
ably search in the bucket with 2 food items (e.g., Feigenson et al.,
2002; Feigenson andCarey, 2003, 2005). In similar comparisons of
1 vs. 3 and 2 vs. 3, they search in the bucket with numerically and
physically more food items. However, in cases where more than 3
items are placed in any given bucket (e.g., 2 vs. 4; 1 vs. 4), infants
are not able to reliably choose the bucket with more food items.
These highly replicable failures, seen in a variety of paradigmswith
infants (e.g., Feigenson and Carey, 2003, 2005; Xu, 2003; Lipton
and Spelke, 2004), combined with the processing dissociations in
human adults (e.g., Jevons, 1871; Kaufman et al., 1949; Trick and
Pylyshyn, 1994), have led some to propose that parallel individ-
uation is engaged exclusively when processing sets with a small
number of objects (1–3 or 4) and the approximate number system
is engaged exclusively when processing sets with larger numbers
of objects (>4; see Simon et al., 1995; Uller et al., 1999; Feigen-
son et al., 2002, 2004; Xu, 2003; Lipton and Spelke, 2004; Ansari
et al., 2007; Van Herwegen et al., 2008). Under this view, what will
be called here the “two systems view,” the parallel individuation
system is specialized to represent small numbers and the approx-
imate number system is specialized to represent large numbers;
numerical range determines when each system will be engaged.
Other evidence, however, suggests that the approximate num-
ber systemoperates over both large and small numbers (e.g.,Moyer
and Landauer, 1967, 1973; Meck and Church, 1983; Brannon and
Terrace, 1998; Cordes et al., 2001; Cantlon and Brannon, 2006).
For example, Cordes et al. (2001) showed that when adult subjects
were asked to tap a table a given number of times while under
articulatory suppression, their tapping of both small and large
numerosities showed the systematic variability characteristic of the
approximate number system. Similarly, Brannon and colleagues
have shown that the ability to order small and large numerosi-
ties is a function of the ratio between the numbers to be ordered
in non-human primates and adults under articulatory suppres-
sion, suggesting the approximate number system is operating over
the entire range of numbers used (e.g., Brannon and Terrace, 1998;
Cantlon and Brannon, 2006). In addition,most formalmathemat-
ical models of non-symbolic number representation in the brain
assume all numbers are represented by the approximate num-
ber system (e.g., Meck and Church, 1983; Church and Broadbent,
1990; Dehaene and Changeux, 1993; Zorzi and Butterworth, 1999;
Verguts and Fias, 2004; Nieder and Merten, 2007). This type of
evidence has led some to adopt, what will be called here the “one
system view” of numerical cognition. Importantly, proponents of
the “one system view” do not deny the existence of the parallel
individuation system, but contest that the approximate number
system operates over the entire range of numbers, large and small.
From this view, it is unclear exactly what conditions elicit differen-
tial representations from parallel individuation and approximate
number. One proposal is that both types of representations are
formedover sets simultaneously andunder some conditions repre-
sentations of parallel individuation override those of approximate
numerosity when acting on the world (e.g., Cordes and Brannon,
2009; Burr et al., 2010, 2011). Another proposal is that object ﬁle
representations are formed over small numbers initially and then
these representations are converted to approximate numerosity
representations (e.g., Cordes and Brannon, 2009).
In sum, most researchers agree that humans and many non-
human animals possess both the ability to represent a set as an
approximate numerical value or as distinct object ﬁles. Further-
more, there is accord that the ability to represent individual items
in parallel is limited to only several items at a given moment.
Until recently, however, the ﬁeld has disagreed as to the condi-
tions that activate each system and, in particular, whether these
systems are specialized for small and large numbers. Recent work
in psychophysics and, in particular, cognitive neuroscience, with
non-human animals, human infants, and human adults has pro-
vided empirical evidence for the distinctness of these systems in
the brain and a better understanding of the experimental condi-
tions that elicit representations from each system3. Furthermore,
this recent work suggests a hybrid view of the “two systems” and
“one system”views by delineating the conditions under which each
system is engaged and the cognitive constraints that underlie this
delineation.
RECENT INSIGHTS
DISTINCT REPRESENTATIONS
Recent work has directly contrasted small and large number pro-
cessing using common measures and methods. This work has
shown that undermany conditions small numbers are represented
differently than large numbers. For example, a recent event-related
potential (ERP) study showed that human adults spontaneously
encode number while passively viewing dot arrays; however, small
and large numbers are encoded differently (Hyde and Spelke,
2009). Small numbers (1–3 items) evoke an early posterior pari-
etal response (N1) that scales with the number of individuals in
the set irrespective of the number in the array that preceded it.
3The current literature review focuses on work conducted within the last 5 years.
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In contrast, large numbers evoke a later, mid-latency component
over posterior parietal scalp (P2p) that scales with the ratio of
numerical change between successive sets (Hyde andSpelke,2009).
These signatures mirror the behavioral signature limits of the two
systems (Feigenson et al., 2004) to suggest that the approximate
number system and the parallel individuation system are being
differentially engaged over large and small numbers under these
conditions. Similarly, in an ERP number comparison task, Liber-
tus et al. (2007) also observed distinct early signatures for small
numbers (Libertus et al., 2007).
Psychophysics has further conﬁrmed the qualitative distinction
between small and large number processing (Revkin et al., 2008;
Piazza et al., 2011). For example, Revkin et al. (2008) showed
that estimates of large and small numbers differ in reaction time,
accuracy, and the distribution of the answers. Furthermore, indi-
vidual variability in the small number range does not correlate
with individual variability in the large number range and indi-
vidual differences in subitizing capacity do not correlate with
individual differences in large non-symbolic number compari-
son precision (Revkin et al., 2008; Piazza et al., 2011). Together
these results suggest small number subitizing relies on a distinct
cognitive mechanism from estimation of larger numbers and that,
under these conditions, small numbers are not being represented
as approximate numerical magnitudes.
It is reasonable to posit that the distinct signatures for small
compared to large numbers arise from the extensive practice
human adults have at enumerating, visualizing, and remember-
ing small numbers of items, 1–3, compared to larger numbers of
items like 8 or 32. As mentioned above, previous work showing
differences in small and large number processing in non-human
animals and pre-verbal human infants suggests that this may not
be the case. Recent work has strengthened the case for an innate
difference between small and large number processing, as opposed
to an experiential difference. For example, Cordes and Brannon
(2009) used a habituation method to show that young infants fail
to dishabituate to changes in number that cross the small/large
number divide and it is only when the ratio is increased to a 1:4
ratio (e.g., 2 vs. 8) that infants succeed at discriminating a large
and a small number. Furthermore,Hyde and Spelke (2011a), using
the same ERP measure and similar passive viewing methods as in
adults, showed distinct brain signatures for small and large num-
bers in human infants that parallel those observed in adults (Hyde
and Spelke, 2009, 2011a; but see Izard et al., 2008). These results
in infants without any numerical education, symbolic number
practice, and/or spoken language present a strong case for innate
differences between small and large number processing that are
not dependent on formal numerical experience or language.
Directly comparing small and large numbers has also resulted
in qualitative and quantitative dissociations in animals evolution-
arily far removed from humans (Agrillo et al., 2007; Rugani et al.,
2008, 2010; Piffer et al., 2011). For example, Agrillo et al. (2007)
showed that ﬁsh are able to discriminate between two social groups
of peers at a closer ratio (e.g., 2 vs. 3 or 3 vs. 4) when groups are
made up of smaller numbers of ﬁsh, compared to the ratio at
which they can discriminate between two social groups that con-
tain larger numbers of ﬁsh (Agrillo et al., 2007). Furthermore,
like human infants, ﬁsh fail to discriminate between numbers that
cross the small/large divide (3 vs. 5) until the ratio difference is
increased (Piffer et al., 2011). Similarly, young chickens have been
shown to discriminate between two small numbers, but fail to
discriminate between a large and a small number, or two large
numbers unless the ratio between them is increased substantially
(Rugani et al., 2008, 2010). These results, in species far removed
from humans, further support the idea of innate representational
differences between small and large number processing.
Together this evidence suggests that the “one system view”does
not always hold. That is, approximate number representations are
not always formed over sets of small numbers of objects under
experimental conditions where they are clearly formed over large
numbers.
DISTINCT NEURAL MECHANISMS
Recent neurophysiological and neuroimaging work also suggests
that the distinct neural and behavioral signatures of the two sys-
tems arise from anatomically distinct brain regions. For example,
Hyde and Spelke (2011b) used the low resolution electromagnetic
tomography (LORETA) source localization algorithm to estimate
the neural origin of ERP signatures of small and large num-
ber processing. Early, distinctly small number ERPs signatures
(modulation by cardinal value) appeared to arise from extras-
triate visual regions including superior and lateral portions of
visual cortex and later small number processing appeared to arise
from right temporal–parietal junction (RTPJ) and left parietal
regions, whereas distinctly large number processing (modulation
by numerical ratio of change between successive images) appeared
to arise primarily from right intraparietal regions.
In a similar vein, Ansari and colleagues used functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure the brain response as
subjects performed a number comparison task. They found that
small number comparisons elicited an increase activity in theRTPJ,
whereas large number comparisons elicited a decrease in activity
in the RTPJ and an increase in activity in the parietal occipital sul-
cus (Ansari et al., 2007). Similar RTPJ activity has independently
been observed in anther study contrasting enumeration of small
and large numbers (Vetter et al., 2011). Both groups attribute the
small number RTPJ activity to stimulus driven attention, that is
not present or not present to the same extent in large number
processing.
Finally, a complementary line of functional neuroimagingwork
suggests encoding of individual objects may occur within the IPS
as well (Culham et al., 1998, 2001; Xu and Chun, 2006; Xu, 2009).
More speciﬁcally, recent work suggests that inferior IPS activity
scales with the number of objects in scene up to about three to
four and then plateaus while the superior IPS responds to dif-
ferences in object identity, but not number. These results suggest
that portions of the inferior IPS support the initial selection and
individuation of a limited number of objects from a scene (up to
about four), in contrast to the lateral occipital complex and the
superior IPS, which seem to support object identiﬁcation (Xu and
Chun, 2006; Xu, 2009).
In sum, recent neuroimaging results further contest the “one
systemview”that approximate number representations are formed
over small numbers, as small number processing undermany con-
ditions elicits qualitatively distinct patterns of brain activity in
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anatomically distinct regions compared to activity elicited for large
numerosities.
DIFFERENTIAL ENGAGEMENT OF ATTENTION
The functional neuroimaging and electrophysiological evidence
provided above points to the possibility that small and large num-
bers differentially recruit attention. Speciﬁcally, ERP markers of
attentional processing (e.g., N1 component) are modulated in
qualitatively different ways for small and large numbers; early
ERPs increase as number increases for small but not large num-
bers (e.g., Hyde and Spelke, 2009, 2011a,b). Furthermore, small
and large number processing recruit at least some distinct brain
regions (Ansari et al., 2007; Vetter et al., 2011; Hyde and Spelke,
2011b). The particular brain regions recruited distinctly for small
numbers (or modulated by small, but not large numbers), such
as a portion of the inferior IPS and RTPJ (see Corbetta and Shul-
man, 2002 for a review), have been linked to attentional effects
whereas the regions uniquely identiﬁed for large numbers (or
that respond more to large than small numbers) and some of
the regions that respond to both large and small numbers have
not necessarily been linked to attentional effects. The most recent
and exciting work contrasting small and large numbers has exper-
imentally tested what the above reported results imply, attention
and/orworkingmemory operate differentially over small and large
numbers.
One line of this work looks at the role of attention and working
memory in enumeration of small and large numbers (subitizing
small numbers vs. counting or estimation of larger numbers). For
example, one recent study showed that subitizing (rapid, quick,
and near perfect enumeration of small numbers) is inhibited
during a dual task with high attentional load but estimation is
not (Burr et al., 2010; but see Vetter et al., 2008 for contradic-
tory results). Another study showed that individual differences in
subitizing correlated with individual differences in working mem-
ory, but not individual differences in estimation abilities (Piazza
et al., 2011). Furthermore, holding several items in working mem-
ory while jointly attempting to subitize reduced the capacity limit
of the subitizing range. Importantly, the same working memory
dual task does not impair estimation abilities (Piazza et al., 2011).
Impairments to subitizing are also observed using an attentional
blink paradigm (Egeth et al., 2008; Olivers and Watson, 2008; Xu
and Liu, 2008). Interestingly, increasing viewing eccentricity also
decreases enumeration accuracy for small numbers but not large
numbers (Palomares et al., 2011).
Another exciting line of work investigating the role of atten-
tion in numerical processing has looked at neural adaptation to
number. This research has typically shown that the brain adapts to
the numerosity of large but not small numbers (Burr and Ross,
2008). One recent study, however, looked at the ability of the
brain to adapt to numerosity under attentional load.Adaptation to
numerosity was observed for small and large numbers when sub-
jects were under high attentional load but was only seen for large
numerositieswhen subjects arenotunder an attentional load (Burr
et al., 2011). Another recent study measured the electrophysiolog-
ical brain response to passive viewing of small and large numbers
under conditions within and beyond the limits of attention (Hyde
andWood, 2011).When subjects viewed small numbers presented
beyond the resolution limits (smaller individual items, crowded,
and in the periphery) or under high attentional load (perform-
ing an attention demanding rapid serial visual presentation task)
the brain signatures of the approximate number system and not
parallel individuation were observed for small numbers. In con-
trast, when items were viewed within the resolution of attention
(larger, further spaced items) or under no additional attentional
load (same visual stimuli with no dual task), the brain signatures
of parallel individuation, but not the approximate number system,
were observed for small numbers.
These results, like those presented above, contest the “one sys-
tem view” by showing that when stimuli are presented within the
limits of attention, approximate number representations are not
formed over small numbers. However, these results also contest
the “two systems view” to suggest that the two systems are not spe-
cialized for small or large numbers per se, but rather are engaged
differentially depending on the nature of the visual stimuli pre-
sented and the attentional or workingmemory constraints in place
(Burr et al., 2010, 2011; Hyde andWood, 2011; Piazza et al., 2011).
A UNIFYING THEORY OF THE TWO NUMERICAL SYSTEMS
Recent studies bring together ﬁndings of both similarities and dif-
ferences between small and large number processing to suggest:
(1) The two systems are qualitatively and anatomically distinct.
(2) The two systems are not specialized for small and large num-
bers. (3) The two systems are crucially affected by limits to early
visual, attentional, andworkingmemory. These novel results unify
the “one system view” and the “two systems view” to provide an
account of the conditions underwhich each system is engaged over
a set of items.
General constraints on visual processing, attention, and work-
ing memory determine if a given set of items is represented as
individual object ﬁles or as an approximate numerical magni-
tude (Burr et al., 2010, 2011; Hyde and Wood, 2011; Piazza et al.,
2011). Small numbers are often represented distinctly from large
numbers because they fall within the limits of the brain to individ-
uate and track simultaneously (see Feigenson et al., 2004). In fact,
when items are presented within the limits of the brain to form
object ﬁles, parallel individuationmay be the default. Importantly,
under these conditions, small numbers do not appear to be rep-
resented as approximate numerical magnitudes. That is, none of
the evidence accrued to this point suggests that small numbers
are spontaneously represented both through the parallel indi-
viduation system and through the approximate number system.
Dichotomous and qualitatively different representations explain
striking developmental failures in infants and some non-human
animals to distinguish numbers that cross the small/large divide, as
well as the differential behavioral and brain signatures of small and
large number processing observed in infants and adults (Feigen-
son and Carey, 2003, 2005; Xu, 2003; Cordes and Brannon, 2009;
Hyde and Spelke, 2009, 2011a,b).
Large numerosities, in contrast, always fall beyond the limits of
the brain to encode, remember, and simultaneously track distinct
individual items. Therefore, the default, at least for simultane-
ously presented large quantities, appears to be representation as a
numerical magnitude. Furthermore, if small number sets are pre-
sented beyond the limits of the brain to encode as individual object
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ﬁles (e.g., too close together) or if sufﬁcient attentional/working
memory resources are not available (e.g., because resources are tied
up in another task), it appears that small numbers are also repre-
sented as approximate numerical magnitudes like large numbers.
This can explain the cases where processing of small quanti-
ties shows the signatures of approximate number representation
(Cordes et al., 2001; Burr et al., 2011; Hyde andWood, 2011). For
example, articulatory suppression, attentional blink, or dual task
paradigms, which demand substantial attentional resources, often
lead small number processing to show variability consistent with
the approximate number representation (e.g., Cordes et al., 2001).
This proposal can also potentially explain studies showing
infant success at discriminating numbers across the small/large
boundary (evidence for common representation of small and
large numbers; e.g., Cordes and Brannon, 2009). The experimen-
tal manipulation through which successful discrimination across
the small/large boundary is achieved (increasing the ratio between
the small and large number from 2 vs. 4 to 2 vs. 8) also correlates
with a substantial decrease in the spacing of individual objects
(as a by-product of the non-numerical controls employed). It is
plausible, given the evidence provided above, that the decrease in
spacing of objects in the 2 vs. 8 condition, not the increase in ratio
in and of itself, exceeded the limits of the infant visual attention
system to encode the items as object ﬁles, resulting in represen-
tation of the set as an approximate numerical magnitude. If this
were correct, decreasing the spacing of objects in the 2 vs. 4 condi-
tion beyond the attentional limits to form object ﬁles, would also
produce success (without increasing the ratio).
Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of how the cur-
rent proposal might work. When presented with a set of items,
numerical representation through parallel individuation occurs if
attention selects individual items and subsequently forms a men-
tal symbol, or object ﬁle, for each individual item in the set. Each
object ﬁle is then stored in workingmemory and the speciﬁc prop-
erties of each item can then be bound to themental representation
of each speciﬁc individual (e.g., size, color, type, category,meaning,
FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of number representation through the
approximate number system and the parallel individuation system.
etc.). If attention is not able to select individuals because the limits
are surpassed (e.g., too many, they are too close together, engaged
in another attention demanding task, etc.), the set is summarized
by a single mental symbol and properties of the set, or ensemble
statistics, will be calculated, approximate numerosity being one
property of the set.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
One open question is if number can be simultaneously represented
through parallel individuation and the approximate number sys-
tem over a single set or subset of objects4. None of the evidence
accrued to this point suggests that the same items are being simul-
taneously represented as individual object ﬁles and as an approxi-
mate numerical magnitudes. On the contrary, the evidence to date
suggests that early attentional selection and subsequent cognitive
encoding determine whether a given set of objects will be spon-
taneously represented as set of individual object ﬁles or as a set
with an approximate numerical magnitude (e.g., Burr et al., 2011;
Hyde and Wood, 2011). However, such a dichotomous process, if
it exists, is certainly only a bias of spontaneous mental representa-
tion of number. It is certainly the case that a set of objects can be
reanalyzed and encoded differently. This undoubtedly occurs in
real world situations where our initial analysis of the visual scene
has to be quickly revised or refocused for our current action.
Most of the work cited presents items simultaneously and often
quickly. Less explored is the representation of number during
sequential processing. Although sequential presentation has been
used developmentally (e.g., Feigenson and Carey, 2003, 2005)
and has produced some interesting similarities and differences
to simultaneous processing, it has not been adequately explored
and directly contrasted with simultaneous presentation to study
numerical cognition. Sequential presentation is important for
future work to determine if the same numerical signatures of
the two systems hold and if attentional and working memory
constraints similarly operate.
It is also unclear if the current proposal generalizes to other sen-
sory domains such as audition and somatosensation. Systematic
studies comparing numerical cognition across sensory modalities
would be helpful in elucidating potential sensory-speciﬁc contri-
butions to the mental representation of numerosity. A promising
recent line of work appears to show that limits on parallel individ-
uation/object ﬁle representation are not restricted to perceptual
processes, as they extend to the planning of actions as well (Gal-
livan et al., 2011). However, at this point, it is still unclear if
the general principles established for visual numerical represen-
tation apply equally or differentially to other sensory modalities.
For example, Wood and Spelke (2005) showed similar develop-
ment from 6 to 9months in precision of representing number of
actions (number of times a puppet jumped) as have been shown
with visual stimuli (e.g., Xu, 2003). More speciﬁcally, 6-month-
old infants can tell the difference between 4 and 8 jumps, but not
between 4 vs. 6 or 2 vs. 4 jumps. On the other hand, vanMarle and
Wynn (2009) found that infants could discriminate 2 from 4 tones,
4This question is different from the question of whether number can be estimated
for multiple sets in parallel, which evidence suggests is the case (Halberda et al.,
2006).
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but not 2 from 3 tones. They interpreted this behavioral pattern to
suggest infants were using the approximate number system in the
auditory domain and that the limits of this system are similar in
the auditory and visual domains (because infants of this age fail at
2 vs. 3 ratios but not at 1:2 ratios with large numbers in the visual
domain).While it is certainly the case that infants could have been
engaging the approximate number system here and this is consis-
tent with the proposal above, it is unclear why they succeed at 2
vs. 4 in the auditory domain, but fail in the visual domain (e.g.,
Xu, 2003; Cordes and Brannon, 2009). A better understanding
of the attentional limits in simultaneously representing individu-
als in other sensory domains may provide some insight into this
puzzle.
Here we display work showing a variety of constraints on
attentional resources change the way the brain represents objects
numerically. Beyond the scope of this paper, however, there is a
vast literature showing that attention can be divided into different
sub-types, namely bottom-up and top-down attention, and dif-
ferent types of attention are constrained by different factors (see
Corbetta and Shulman, 2002 for a review). For example, top-down
attentional processing is constrained by increasing perceptual or
working memory load, while bottom-up attentional processing
is constrained by stimulus degradation (e.g., Lavie and de Fock-
ert, 2003; Lavie, 2005; Awh et al., 2006). It may also be the case
that perceptual or cognitive factors that facilitate grouping items
vs. treating them individuals interact with attention to bias the
way in which numerosity is represented. For example, Gestalt
principles such as proximity, similarity, or closure (for a review
see Todorovic, 2007) or cognitive factors such as whether items
are seen as an “object” (e.g., Egly et al., 1994) may differentially
bias how attention is allocated, thereby inﬂuencing whether items
will be represented as a group with an approximate numerical
magnitude instead of individual items. Future work on numerical
cognition should carefully consider the role and/or interaction of
top-downandbottom-upattentional processing,aswell as thepar-
ticular environmental constraints present, in the representation of
numerosity through the two systems.
Future work should also investigate potential distinctions and
interactions between attention and working memory in non-
symbolic number representation. Early ERP signatures suggest
attention is distributed differentially when a set of items is encoded
as individual object ﬁles compared to when it is encoded as
an approximate numerical magnitude (Hyde and Spelke, 2009,
2011a,b;Hyde andWood, 2011). Other work on remembering and
tracking objects shows sensitivity in later processing to remem-
bering and tracking objects (e.g., Luck and Vogel, 1997; Drew and
Vogel, 2008). One question for future work would be how these
early attentional effects interface with working memory repre-
sentations of non-symbolic number downstream. More generally,
numerical cognition may provide an avenue to further investigate
attention and working memory, their respective limits, and the
interplay.
Finally, certain insights gained from this proposal, namely early
attentional constraints determine the nature of number represen-
tation, must be considered when investigating the role of each
system in the development of uniquely human numerical and
mathematical abilities. The ﬁeld has shown a surge of excitement
from recent work linking the precision of approximate number
representations with numerical and mathematical achievement in
school (Halberda et al., 2008; Gilmore et al., 2010; Piazza et al.,
2010; Bugden and Ansari, 2011); Furthermore, at least one lead-
ing proposal as to how children acquire natural number concepts
implicates parallel individuation as a crutch in this process (Le
Corre and Carey, 2007; Carey, 2009). Future work should carefully
examine individual differences in parallel individuation, approxi-
mate number representation, as well as the inﬂuence of individual
differences in attention and working memory, to form a better
understanding of the role each of these cognitive abilities plays in
forming uniquely human numerical and mathematical concepts.
CONCLUSION
The emerging picture from recent work is that the two established
systems of non-symbolic number representation do not operate
in isolation from other cognitive and perceptual limits, nor do
they appear to operate in parallel of each other. Rather, numerical
information is encoded differentially from a set of objects based
on what is presented and what else the brain is doing.
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